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Abstract
Immigrant assimilation is a major issue in many countries. While most
of the literature studies assimilation through a human capital framework, we
examine the role of job search assimilation. To do so, we estimate an equilibrium
search model of immigrants operating in the same labor market as natives,
where newly arrived immigrants have lower job offer arrival rates than natives
but can acquire the same arrival rates according to a stochastic process. Using
Canadian panel data, we find substantial differences in job offer arrival and
destruction rates between natives and immigrants that are able to account for
three fifths of the observed earnings gap. The estimates imply that immigrants
take, on average, 13 years to acquire the native search parameters. The job
search assimilation process generates 18% earnings growth for immigrants in a
40 year period following migration.
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Introduction

Immigration has always played a major role in Canada. It serves as an important
source of labour for the country, and therefore successful integration of immigrants
in the labour market has direct implications for the Canadian economy. There is a
large literature documenting and analyzing Canadian immigration patterns and the
relative success of Canadian immigrants by landing cohort and immigrant type in
the labour market.1 The vast majority of this research, and for that matter research
on immigrant assimilation in all countries, has been based on the standard human
capital model.2
The lower earnings of immigrants upon arrival is attributed to their lower levels
of human capital specific to the host country, and the catch-up of their earnings is
explained by their stronger incentives to invest in host-country specific human capital.
Numerous papers have been written studying the relationship between immigrants’
earnings and observable characteristics related to their human capital acquired in the
source country as well as that acquired in the host country. The set of characteristics
often includes information on educational attainment and labour market experience
in each country as well as age and literacy level at immigration.3
A new approach to the immigrant-native earnings gap has recently emerged and is
asking how much of the gap is due to differences in job search behavior.4 . There are a
number of reasons to expect that new immigrants face a different search environment
than natives. First, it is natural to think that newly arrived immigrants are simply not
accustomed to local practices of job search. Second, the same factors accounting for
the native-immigrant human capital gap may contribute to job search differentials
between natives and immigrants. Examples include qualification recognition and
language fluency. Possible difficulties of having foreign credentials recognized by
employers may slow the application process, while language fluency likely plays an
important role in the job search and interview processes.5
1

See, for example, Abbott and Beach (2011), Green and Worswick (2010), Xue (2010), Baker
and Benjamin (1994), and Sweetman and Warman (2013).
2
Chiswick (1978); Borjas (1999)
3
See, for example, Skuterud and Su (2012).
4
Examples include Chassamboulli and Palivos (2010), Ortega (2000) and Liu (2010), and Gupta
and Kromann (2013)
5
Oreopoulos (2011) and Dechief and Oreopoulos (2012) provide evidence that employers discriminate against job applicants with foreign-sounding names in hiring, associating with them low local
language skills.
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It is also important to consider the role of social networks in job search. Differences
in networks formed and network usage between natives and immigrants are likely to
be reflected in differences in job search outcomes between natives and immigrants. A
number of papers have documented that workers utilize friends and relatives when
searching for a job, and recent work indicates that social networks are especially important for newly-arrived immigrants. Using the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants
to Canada (LSIC), Goel and Lang (2012) find that having close friends or relatives
in Canada significantly increases the likelihood that recently arrived immigrants will
find employment within the first six months of their arrival.6 Other examples include Munshi (2003) who documents that use of social networks is very common in
acquiring employment for Mexican migrant workers in the United States, and Frijters
et al. (2005) who document that immigrants in the U.K. tend to rely on their social
networks to obtain a job more than natives.
Taking this idea of differences in job search behaviour one step further this paper
uses search theory to examine the role of job search in immigrant assimilation. The
idea being that not only can immigrants invest in human capital once they enter
the host country to achieve earnings assimilation but that they can also learn more
about the labour market and how to better search for a job. This idea is similar
to that proposed by Daneshvary et al. (1992) who take the view that immigrants
acquire more information about the host country’s labour market the longer they
have been there and this results in earnings that are much closer to their potential
or maximum attainable earnings. Here we take a different approach and develop a
Burdett-Mortensen style general equilibrium search model with two types of workers:
immigrant workers and native workers. Importantly, new immigrants face more search
frictions than natives but over time can assimilate such that they face the same search
frictions as natives.
The Burdett-Mortensen equilibrium search model has been used to explain earnings differentials between many different groups, including the male-female earnings
gap (Bowlus, 1997), the black-white earnings gap (Bowlus et al., 2001; Bowlus and
Eckstein, 2002), and the family earnings gap (Zhang, 2012). This paper extends this
tradition to the immigrant earnings gap. The Burdett-Mortensen search model can
generate earnings differentials because how fast workers are able to generate job offers
6

Interestingly the structural estimates of their search model reveal that the presence of close ties
in Canada increases the likelihood of receiving a job offer but does not help in finding better offers.
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has direct implications for their earnings. More specifically, the theory predicts that
the distribution of the earnings of a group with higher job offer arrival rates dominates that of a group with lower rates. If new immigrants have search behaviour that
is characterized by lower job offer arrival rates than those of native born workers, the
model will predict an immigrant earnings gap. However, if there is an assimilation
process such that immigrants can learn how to search more effectively over time and
increase their arrival rates of job offers, then the model predicts that this assimilation
of the search process will provide a mechanism for earnings convergence.
To conduct our analysis we build on the model developed by Zhang (2012) to
study the difference in earnings between mothers and non-mothers. Zhang extended
the Burdett-Mortensen equilibrium search model in two important ways. First, her
model has two groups of workers with different job offer arrival rates conducting job
search in a single labour market.7 Second, her model allows one of the groups (in her
case non-mothers) to transition to the other group (mothers). Firms then take these
transitions into account when posting offers and equilibrium earnings differentials
result. This model setting fits our purposes well as it is important for us to model both
the job search differences between immigrants and natives, but also the possibility
that immigrants can assimilate and become like natives in their job search behaviour.
In addition, we also capture the general equilibrium effects of both the presence of
the immigrants in the labour market and their assimilation behaviour on not only
their earnings levels but also on those of natives.
We estimate the model using duration and earnings data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) to measure the difference in job offer
arrival rates between new immigrants and natives, and estimate how long it takes
immigrants to acquire the same job search parameters as natives. Then, we study
the implications of this assimilation process for the earnings gap between immigrants
and natives, and immigrants’ earnings growth.8
Our estimation results indicate that there are substantial and significant differences in job offer arrival and job destruction rates between natives and newly arrived
immigrants. Job offer arrival rates for immigrants are 36% lower while unemployed
7

Prior to Zhang (2012) the standard method was to assume that the two groups were operating
in separate markets. Because of the assimilation process this standard method is not suitable for
our setting.
8
Papers using SLID to study immigrant assimilation include Skuterud and Su (2012), Hum and
Simpson (2004) and Hum and Simpson (2000).
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and 93% lower while employed. The latter figure has substantial consequences for the
amount of search frictions faced by immigrants. Immigrants receive almost no job
offers during an employment spell compared to natives who receive nearly 2 offers.
Importantly, these differences are able to account for three quarters of the observed
earnings differential between natives and immigrants.
Our results also indicate that it takes immigrants 13 years, on average, to assimilate and acquire the same search parameters as natives. Studies of earnings assimilation using the human capital framework have reported a wide range of estimates
of the time it takes for assimilation. In a recent study on assimilation of Canadian
immigrants Skuterud and Su (2012) find an initial gap of 0.29 log points is halved
after 8 years and a slower narrowing subsequently. Thus our results on the search
component are consistent in magnitude with the human capital based assimilation
literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
model and its implications for earnings. Section 3 discusses the estimation strategy
and data. The estimation results are given in Section 4 followed by concluding remarks
in Section 5.

2
2.1

Equilibrium Search Model
Environment

As noted above our model is a version of the equilibrium search model in Zhang
(2012). Here we describe the model noting the differences between immigrant and
native workers. In the model, time is continuous and the economy is in a steady
state. There are a large number of firms and workers in the labour market, with the
population of the workers normalized to 1. All workers are either native or immigrant
workers. The measure of immigrant workers is denoted by µ ∈ (0, 1).
There are two types of immigrant workers. A type 1 immigrant worker represents
an individual new to the country and unfamiliar with its labour market. A type
2 immigrant worker represents an immigrant who has lived in the country for a
sufficiently long period and as a result has acquired the same level of knowledge of
the local labour market as native workers. A type 1 immigrant worker may become a
type 2 immigrant worker over time. This event is modeled as a Poisson process with

5

arrival rate η.
All workers are either unemployed or employed, and search for jobs both on and
off the job. If workers are unemployed, they receive b, the flow value of non-market
time while unemployed. The arrival of job offers is modeled as a Poisson process. For
native-born workers and type 2 immigrant workers, the job offer arrival rate is λ0 if
they are unemployed and λ1 if they are employed. Because of their lack of knowledge
about the labour market, it takes type 1 immigrant workers longer to receive a job
offer, on average. For type 1 immigrant workers, the job offer arrival rate is α0 λ0
while unemployed and α1 λ1 while employed, where 0 < αi < 1 for i = 0, 1.
All firms have constant returns-to-scale production technologies with labour being
their sole input. We assume that both native and immigrant workers are equally
productive within a firm. However, the productivity of a worker differs across firms.
Specifically, we assume that there are Q types of firms that differ in their marginal
productivity of labour. For a type j firm, pj denotes the per-worker output of the
firm, where we assume pj < pj+1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , Q − 1.
Each firm posts a wage offer w to attract workers. We assume that it must post
the same offer to both native and immigrant workers.9 The distribution of offers in
equilibrium is given by F (w) with support [w, w], and workers and firms meet each
other through random search. This implies that a worker draws a wage offer from
F (w) when receiving a job offer. A worker-firm match can be terminated exogenously
at rate δ1 , forcing the worker into unemployment.
To ensure that both types of immigrants are present in the steady-state, we assume that workers exit from the labour market permanently according to a Poisson
process with arrival rate δ2 . Exiting native workers are replaced by unemployed native workers, while all exiting immigrant workers are replaced by unemployed type 1
immigrant workers.
9

That is immigrants and natives are competing in the same labour market. If firms could post
separate offers, then effectively the two markets would be separate. This assumption does tie our
hands somewhat in the degree to which the model can generate an immigrant earnings differential.
However, we prefer this specification of direct competition both in terms of the assimilation process
and in terms of understanding the impact the lower search frictions of the immigrants has on the
native workers.
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2.2

Workers’ Problem

After receiving an offer, the worker decides whether to accept or reject it. Let Vnu
denote the value of unemployment to native workers, and let Vne (w) denote the value
to native workers of being employed at wage w. Then Vnu is characterized by the
following Bellman equation:
rVnu

Z

w

= b + λ0

h

i

max Vne (x), Vnu − Vnu dF (x) − δ2 Vnu .

(1)

w

The left-hand side of equation (1) represents the payoff to unemployment, while the
right-hand side shows how the payoff is derived. The first term on the right-hand
side is the monetary value of non-market time. The remainder is the option value
of unemployment due to possible transitions out of unemployment. There are two
possible transitions from unemployment. First, at arrival rate λ0 , a worker receives
a job offer, and accepts it if it yields a higher value than unemployment. Second, at
arrival rate δ2 , a worker permanently leaves the labour market and receives the value
of zero thereafter.
Similarly, Vne (w) is characterized by the following Bellman equation:
rVne (w)

Z

w

= w + λ1

h

max

Vne (x), Vne (w)



−

i
dF (x)

Vne (w)

w


+ δ1 Vnu − Vne (w) − δ2 Vne (w). (2)
The left-hand side of equation (2) represents the payoff to a native working at wage
w. The first term on the right-hand side is the wage flow. The remainder indicates
the option value accruing from possible transitions to different states. There are three
possible transitions from the current job. First, at arrival rate λ1 , a worker receives
a new job offer, and decides whether to accept the offer. Second, at arrival rate δ1 ,
a worker is separated from the current job. Third, a worker permanently leaves the
labour market at rate δ2 .
The optimal search strategy of workers has a reservation wage property. While
employed, workers accept any job offer that specifies a higher wage than the current
job. While unemployed, workers optimally set a reservation wage, and accept any
job that offers a wage above the reservation wage, and reject offers otherwise. Let
Rn denote the optimal reservation wage for unemployed native workers. Rn satisfies
7

condition Vne (Rn ) = Vnu . Together with equations (1) and (2), the condition yields
Z

w

Rn = b +
Rn

(λ0 − λ1 )F (x)
dx,
ρ + λ1 F (x)

(3)

where F (w) ≡ 1−F (w) and ρ ≡ r+δ1 +δ2 . Notice that type 2 immigrant workers face
the same problem as native workers. Thus this group of immigrants acts according
to the same reservation wage strategy as native workers.
Type 1 immigrant workers face a slightly different process. Let Vmu denote the
value of being unemployed and Vme (w) denote the value of being employed at wage w
to type 1 immigrant workers. Then Vmu is determined by the following equation:
rVmu

Z

w

= b + α0 λ0

h

i

max(Vme (x), Vmu ) − Vmu dF (x) + η Vnu − Vmu − δ2 Vmu .

(4)

w

When compared with equation (1), equation (4) shows that the option value of unemployment for type 1 immigrants differs from that of natives and type 2 immigrants in
two ways. First, as shown in the second term on the right-hand side, the arrival rate
of job offers is scaled by α0 . Second, as the third term on the right-hand side shows, a
possible change in type also contributes to the option value of unemployment. Similar
points are made for Vme (w), which satisfies the following Bellman equation:
rVme (w)

i
wh

max Vme (x), Vme (w) − Vme (w) dF (x)
= w + α 1 λ1
w
h
i


e
u
e
+ η max Vn (w), Vn − Vm (w) + δ1 Vmu − Vme (w) − δ2 Vme (w). (5)
Z

Again the differences from equation (2) are that the job offer arrival rate is scaled by
α1 , and the optimal response to a change in type is accounted for in the option value.
When a type 1 immigrant working at wage w becomes a type 2 immigrant worker,
it is optimal to quit the current job if Vne (w) < Vnu . Since Vnu = Vne (Rn ), and Vne (w)
is increasing in w, such behavior is optimal only if w < Rn .
It is straightforward to show that Vme (w) is increasing in w, implying that the
optimal search strategy of type 1 immigrant workers is a reservation wage strategy
as well. Employed type 1 immigrant workers accept any job offer that pays a higher
wage than the current job, and unemployed type 1 immigrant workers optimally set
a cut-off wage level, denoted by Rm , and accept any job offering a wage that exceeds
8

Rm and reject otherwise.
The following result shows the equation characterizing Rm :
Proposition 1. Rm solves the following equation:
Z

w

Rm = b +
Rm

(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F (x)
dx +
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x)

w

(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F (x)
η
dx
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x) ρ + λ1 F (x)
Z Rm
ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (x)
η
− I(Rm ≥ Rn )
dx,
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x) ρ + λ1 F (x)
Z

where Rn is given by equation (3).
Proof. See Appendix A.
When η = 0, type 1 immigrant workers never assimilate by changing their types.
In this case, their problem is similar to that of native workers except for the differences
in job offer arrival rates. That is, Rm satisfies essentially the same nonlinear equation
as Rn , since the second and third terms on the right-hand side of equations (4) and (5)
vanish. When η > 0, in contrast, type 1 immigrant workers need to take into account
events that may occur after their type changes in order to set their reservation wage
strategies.
The condition determining the ranking between Rm and Rn is given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Rm ≤ Rn if and only if
Z

w

Rn




ρ + η + λ0 F (x) ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (x) ρ + η + λ1 F (x)
−
dx ≥ 0,
ρ + λ1 F (x)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x) ρ + λ1 F (x)

Proof. See Appendix A.
The above condition is difficult to verify analytically except in a small number of
cases. However, the following two examples show that the ranking between Rm and
Rn is in general ambiguous. First suppose α1 = 1, then the left-hand side becomes
Z

w

Rn

ρ + η + (1 − α0 )λ0 F (x)
dx ≥ 0,
ρ + λ1 F (x)

establishing Rm ≤ Rn . In contrast, if α0 = 1, then the left-hand side of the equation
becomes
Z w
(α1 − 1)(ρ + λ1 F (w))λ1 F (w)
< 0,
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (w)
Rn
9

concluding Rn < Rm .

2.3

Firms’ Problem and Equilibrium Wage Offer Distribution

The equilibrium wage offer distribution is derived from firms’ optimal behaviour.
Given the technology, a firm’s profit is the product of the per-worker profit margin
and the stock of workers in the firm. Letting l(w) denote the steady-state measure
of workers available to a firm offering wage w, the steady state profit flow of a type-j
firm is written as
πj (w) = (pj − w)l(w).
Each firm posts a wage to maximize the steady-state profit flow.
Lemma 1 indicates that in general Rm is not equal to Rn . As pointed out in
Mortensen (1990), the equilibrium wage offer distribution may have gaps in the support when workers with different reservation wages operate in a single labour market.
To avoid complications resulting from this feature of the wage offer distribution, we
follow Zhang (2012) and assume that there is an exogenously set minimum wage in
the economy, denoted by wmin which is set higher than both Rm and Rn . Given this
simplifying assumption, all wage offers will be accepted by all unemployed workers.
The labour stock at a firm paying w can be divided into three components based
on the characteristics of workers:
l(w) = ln (w) + lm1 (w) + lm2 (w)
where ln (w) denotes the steady-state mass of natives working for a firm offering
wage w, and for y ∈ {1, 2}, lmy (w) denotes the steady-state mass of type y immigrants working for a firm offering wage w. These three objects are derived by
balancing the steady-state flows generated by job-to-job, unemployment-to-job and
job-to-unemployment transitions made by workers. In particular, native workers make
these transitions in the same way as modeled in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) with
the exception that permanent exit from the labour market is a possible transition.
The per-firm native worker stock is therefore given by
ln (w) =

λ0 δ(λ1 + δ)
(1 − µ)
(λ0 + δ)(δ + λ1 F (w))2
10

where δ ≡ δ1 + δ2 . For immigrant workers, the steady-state flow analysis is analogous
to that of Zhang (2012) such that the per-firm stocks of type 1 and type 2 immigrant
workers are respectively given by10
lm1 (w) =

α0 λ0 δ2 (δ + η)(δ + η + α1 λ1 )

2 µ,
(α0 λ0 + δ + η)(δ2 + η) δ + η + α1 λ1 F (w)

and
lm2 (w) =

λ0 η(δ + λ1 ) δ(δ + η) + δ1 α0 λ0



2 µ
(η + δ2 )(δ + λ0 )(η + δ + α0 λ0 ) δ + λ1 F (w)

λ0 ηδ2 α0 (δ + η) (δ + λ1 )(δ + η + α1 λ1 ) − α1 λ21 F (w)2
+
2
2 µ.
(η + δ2 )(η + δ + α0 λ0 ) δ + λ1 F (w) δ + η + α1 λ1 F (w)

Note that ln (w), lm1 (w) and lm2 (w) all depend on w only through F (w), the quantile of
w in the offer distribution. Because of this property, it is convenient to express the perfirm labour force in terms of the wage quantile when characterizing the equilibrium
offer distribution. To this end, define l∗ (y) with domain [0, 1] by l∗ (y) = l(F −1 (y)).
Following Mortensen (1990), several properties of the equilibrium hold. First,
all firms with the same productivity level earn the same steady-state profit flow in
equilibrium. Second, the wage offer from a higher productivity firm should be at least
as high as the one from a lower productivity counterpart. Third, the highest wage
offer made by a type j firm corresponds to the lowest wage offer made by a type j + 1
firm. Fourth, w = wmin . Finally, F (w) is implicitly defined by the following equal
profit conditions:
(pj − wLj )l∗ (F (wLj )) = (pj − w)l∗ (F (w)) for w ∈ [wLj , wHj ],

(6)

with wL1 = w and wHj = wLj+1 for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., Q − 1}.
Let γ0 = 0, and for j = 1, 2, . . . , Q, let γj denote the fraction of firms whose
labour productivity is pj or less. Given the equilibrium condition, firms with labour
productivity equal to or less than pj offer wages equal to or less than wHj , and firms
with the higher productivity offer wages above wHj . Therefore F (wHj ) = γj for
10

Unlike Zhang (2012), the present paper does not model transitions in and out of nonparticipation
of workers. Therefore, the results in this paper are obtained by setting the relevant transition
parameters to zero in her model.
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j ∈ {1, ..., Q}, and equation (6) yields
(pj − wHj−1 )l∗ (γj−1 ) = (pj − wHj )l∗ (γj ) for j ∈ {1, . . . , Q}.

(7)

For each firm type j, equation (7) characterizes the upper- and lower-bounds of
possible wage offers made by firms of the given type. This equation can be used
to recover pj from observed wage data. This property of the equilibrium is exploited
in estimation.

2.4

Implications for Native-Immigrant Wage Gap

Given the offer distribution of wages F (w), the earnings distribution of workers is
characterized by the flows generated by the steady-state job-to-job, unemployment-tojob, job-to-unemployment transitions. Let Gn (w) represent the steady-state earnings
distribution among native workers. This takes the standard form:
Gn (w) =

δF (w)
.
δ + λ1 F (w)

(8)

Analogously, let Gm1 (w) and Gm2 (w) denote the steady-state earnings distributions for type 1 and type 2 immigrants, respectively. From Zhang (2012), we have
that these distributions are, respectively, given by
Gm1 (w) =

(δ + η)F (w)
.
δ + η + α1 λ1 F (w)

(9)

and
Gm2 (w) =


δ(η + δ) + α0 λ0 δ1 (δ + η + α1 λ1 F (w)) + (δ + η)(δ + λ0 )δ2 α0
(δ + λ1 F (w)(α0 δ2 + α0 λ0 + δ + η)(δ + η + α1 λ1 F (w))

F (w).

(10)
Equations (8), (9) and (10) establish that these three distributions can be ranked
unambiguously in terms of the first-order stochastic dominance. The following proposition states this result.
Proposition 2. Gn (w) first-order stochastically dominates Gm1 (w) and is first-order
stochastically dominated by Gm2 (w).
Proof. See Appendix A.
12

The first-order stochastic dominance of Gm2 (w) over Gn (w) may not be intuitive
since both of the relevant groups share the same search parameters. The reason
can be thought of as an age-effect. Since an immigrant worker starts as a type 1
immigrant and later become a type 2 immigrant, type 2 immigrants have, on average,
more labour market experience and, therefore, more time to improve their earnings
through job-to-job transitions. In contrast, the native worker group includes workers
who are new to the labour market and have not had a sufficient time to move up the
earnings distribution. Therefore the difference in the average length of time spent in
the labour market between these two groups generates the earnings gap between them.
Analogously, the native group has on average has longer labour market experience
than the type 1 immigrant group. This difference contributes to the ranking between
the earnings distributions of these groups. Moreover, the higher job offer arrival rate
on the job for the native group also widens the earnings gap between natives and
type 1 immigrants.
Even though the native earnings distribution lies between those of type 1 and type
2 immigrant workers, it first-order stochastically dominates the earnings distribution
for the whole immigrant population once we account for the steady-state composition
of the immigrant population. Proposition 3 establishes this result.
Proposition 3. Let Gm (w) denote the earnings distribution for all immigrant workers. Then Gm (w) is first-order stochastically dominated by Gn (w).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Finally, we examine the implications of the model for the earnings dynamics for
both natives and immigrants by deriving the age profiles of their earnings distributions, and show that the model can generate earnings convergence between native
and immigrant workers.
To this end, let Gn (w; a) be the earnings distribution for native workers with
labour market experience given by a. Similarly let Gm (w; a) be the earnings distribution for immigrant workers with host country labour market experience given by
a. The following proposition establishes that Gn (w; a) and Gm (w; a) have the same
limit.
Proposition 4. For given w ∈ [w, w],
lim Gn (w; a) = lim Gm (w; a) =

a→∞

a→∞

13

δ1 F (w)
.
δ1 + λ1 F (w)

Proof. See Appendix A.
The result in Proposition 4 is driven by the gradually increasing share of type
2 immigrants among all immigrants with the same level of (potential) experience.
The model predicts that the share of type 1 immigrants among all immigrants with
a given labour market experience declines as the time spent in the host country’s
labour market increases. Therefore, a group of immigrants with sufficiently long
labour market experience mostly consists of type 2 immigrants, who behave like
native workers. As a result, the earnings distributions converge.

3
3.1

Estimation
Estimation Procedure

The parameters to be estimated are those governing event arrivals (λ0 , λ1 , δ1 , α0 , α1
and η), wage cuts ( w, {wHj }Q
j=1 ), and those representing the productivity heteroQ
geneity of firms ( {(pj , γj )}j=1 ). Estimation is performed by the maximum likelihood
procedure developed by Bowlus et al. (1995, 2001) and Bowlus (1998) and then modified by Zhang (2012).11
First, we use the lowest and highest wages observed in data for the estimates
of w and wHQ . Then the following two-stage optimization routine is repeated until
the log-likelihood value converges. In the first stage, while fixing the event arrival
parameters, we maximize the log-likelihood function by sampling values from the
wages earned by native workers and use them for the estimates of wH1 , ..., wHQ−1 .
In the second stage, while fixing the wage-cut levels, the log-likelihood function is
maximized over the event arrival parameters with a standard iterative optimization
routine. Note that every time the objective function is evaluated at a new guess, γj
and pj are calculated from the other parameters. Specifically, given equation (8), γj
is calculated by
(δ + λ1 )Ĝn (ŵHj )
,
γj =
δ + λ1 Ĝn (ŵHj )
11

There are two other parameters in the model: δ2 and µ. These are calibrated before performing
the estimation procedure described in this section. Specifically, µ, the proportion of immigrants
among the worker population, is set at 0.212 based on the comparable number for 2001. The arrival
rate of permanent exit from the labour market is set at 0.0024, which implies that workers on average
spend 35 years in the labour market.
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where Ĝn (w) is the empirical cumulative distribution function of the wages earned
by native workers, and pj is calculated by
pj =

wHj l∗ (γj ) − wHj−1 l∗ (γj−1 )
.
l∗ (γj ) − l∗ (γj−1 )

from equation (7).
Let θ denote the set of parameters that we aim to estimate, and xi be a list of
variables of individual i. The log-likelihood function is written as
`(θ) =

N
X



(1 − χi ) ln Ln (θ; xi ) + χi ln Lm (θ; τi , xi )

i=1

where Ln (θ; xi ) and Lm (θ; τi , xi ), respectively, denote the likelihood contributions for
native workers and immigrant workers; χi is an indicator variable taking 1 if individual
i is an immigrant and 0 otherwise; and τi denotes individual i’s time since migration.
We write Lm (θ; τi , xi ) as the mixture of likelihood contributions for immigrants of
different types. Let Lm1 (θ; xi ) and Lm2 (θ; xi ) denote the likelihood contribution of
type 1 and type 2 immigrants, respectively, and let πi denote the probability that
immigrant i is type 1 at the start of the survey. Then the likelihood contribution for
an immigrant worker is given by Lm (θ; τi , xi ) = πi Lm1 (θ; xi ) + (1 − πi )Lm2 (θ; xi ), and
the log-likelihood function can be rewritten as
N
X


`(θ) =
(1 − χi ) ln(Ln (θ; xi )) + χi ln πi Lm1 (θ; xi ) + (1 − πi )Lm2 (θ; xi ) . (11)
i=1

The structural model dictates that the length of time in which an immigrant remains
as a type 1 since migration is an exponential random variable with parameter η. Thus
πi = e−ητi . The expressions for Ln (θ; xi ), Lm1 (θ; xi ) and Lm2 (θ; xi ) are given in the
Appendix B.

3.2

Identification

Identification of the structural parameters other than α0 , α1 and η follows Bowlus
et al. (1995) with the parameters governing firms’ productivity heterogeneity identified from the observed earnings distribution and the native search parameters identified from the relevant duration and transition data. Specifically, λ0 is identified from
15

unemployment durations of the natives in the data. Job durations and transitions at
the end of job spells help to identify λ1 and δ1 .
The immigrant job search parameters, α0 and α1 are identified from differences in
unemployment durations and job durations between natives and recently immigrated
individuals as well as differences in unemployment rates. η is identified from variation
in spell durations of immigrants with respect to years since migration as well as
changes in the earnings distribution with respect to years since migration.

3.3

Data

To estimate our model we need panel data on both immigrant and native populations.
We, therefore, make use of the Canadian SLID, which is a household longitudinal
survey containing a wide range of information on the labour market experiences, educational activities and attainment, and demographic characteristics of individuals
residing in the country. The survey has several waves, each of which follows respondents for 6 years. The first wave started in 1994, and a new wave was introduced
every three years such that two contiguous waves overlap for 3 years. Every January,
the survey asks respondents about their labour market activities and/or schooling in
the previous year, enabling the construction of their employment histories.
For this paper, the third and fourth waves of the survey are used to construct the
estimation sample in order to ensure that it contains a sufficient number of immigrant
observations. The third wave covers the period from 1999-2004 and the fourth wave
from 2002-2007. Instead of pooling the 9 years of data we construct employment
histories only from 2002 on for both waves. This results in a shorter panel for the
third wave, but aids in maintaining the stationarity assumption of the model by not
introducing large business cycle effects between the late 1990s and early 2000s.12 We
use cross-section sample weights from 2002 to address issues of attrition.
We restrict the estimation sample to male individuals aged between 20 and 55 in
the beginning of 2002, and exclude respondents who were institutionalized for more
than 6 months or who died during the survey period. Respondents are also excluded
from the sample if information on their educational attainment or key demographic
characteristics, such as the country of birth or years since migration, are missing. In
12

In practice, however, survey non-response or missing information did not allow us to follow every
respondent for the intended period. Rather than excluding these respondents from the estimation
sample, if we encounter a problem, we censor the job history at that point.
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addition, to keep the sample population as homogeneous as possible, we impose a
restriction on the educational attainment of individuals. Specifically, the estimation
sample contains only respondents who had some post-secondary schooling or a postsecondary diploma excluding master’s degree or above. Finally, our model concerns
individuals who are active labour force participants. Thus, we attempt to include
only those who are either working or searching for jobs at any given time. To this
end, we exclude individuals who were mainly in school, were in retirement, or were
disabled or had a long-term illness.
The above model does not consider schooling decisions and, therefore, only captures immigrant assimilation through post-schooling labour market experience. Thus,
it is only relevant for immigrants who completed their schooling before moving to
Canada. However, not every immigrant respondent in SLID meets this modeling assumption. In fact, there are ample cases in which we suspect that individuals moved
to Canada and then went through schooling activities.13 Including those individuals
in the estimation may, therefore, be problematic as various studies argue that there
are differences in labour market outcomes between immigrants who were educated in
Canada and those who were not.14 Although SLID contains information on schooling activities during the survey, it provides less information on schooling undertaken
before the survey.15 To address this complication, we exclude immigrants who migrated to Canada before age 20 as a rough approximation for the desired sampling
restriction.
We construct individual labour market histories by first identifying all the jobs
held during the survey period. We define a job by an employment relationship with a
particular employer, and to be counted as a job spell in our data set an employment
relationship needs to last for more than 30 days and have 30 or more usual weekly
hours of work.
While the model in this paper does not consider multiple job holding, it is not
uncommon to observe individuals who worked for more than one employer simultaneously. To reconcile the difference, when observing an instance of multiple job
13

For a number of immigrant respondents, the reported age at immigration is lower than the
typical age of the reported completed schooling level. For example, immigrants reporting a college
degree who migrated at age 18 likely obtained their degrees in Canada.
14
See, for example, Skuterud and Su (2012) and Ferrer and Riddell (2008).
15
There is a survey question asking respondents where they did most of their elementary and
high-school education. However, no such information is available for post-secondary schooling.
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holding, we assume that the spell that started later did not begin until the one that
started earlier ended, and adjust the starting date of the latter job accordingly. This
treatment of multiple job-holding is common in the literature.16
When a job spell is completed, the type of transition made at the end of the spell
is based on how long it takes the worker to start a new job. We determine that an
individual makes a job-to-job transition if the gap between two jobs is less than 14
days. Otherwise, the gap is treated as an unemployment spell and the transition is
recorded as a job-to-unemployment transition.
Wage information is converted into monthly terms based on the reported unit
of pay, and converted into real terms with year 2002 as the base year. In order to
exclude extreme observations, we trimmed the top 3% and bottom 2% of the earnings
distribution.17
The above steps yield the final estimation sample of size 3877, with 228 immigrant observations. Of the constructed labour market histories during the survey,
the following set of information is used to calculate the likelihood contributions. The
first pieces of information that enter into the likelihood are the employment status
and residual duration of the first spell. If it is a job spell, the wage earned on the
job and, if applicable, the type of transition made at the end of the spell are also
included in the likelihood. If the initial spell is a complete unemployment spell, the
characteristics of the following job spell enter into the likelihood as well. If the initial
spell is a complete job spell, the duration of the next spell is also included in the
likelihood but only if it is an unemployment spell.
Table 1 shows the sample statistics from the estimation sample.18 Row 2 shows
that the fractions of individuals who were initially unemployed were 0.053 for natives
and 0.134 for immigrants, yielding a gap of 0.081. In addition to a higher unemployment rate, immigrants also have a longer mean unemployment duration than natives.
The mean job durations are about 36 months and 30 months for natives and immigrants, respectively, and job spells exhibit high censoring rates for both groups.19
While two fifths of the completed job spells ended with transitions to a new job for
16

See, for example, Bowlus et al. (2001).
Trimming is standard in this literature to avoid estimates of reservation wages that are too small
and productivity estimates that are too large. See Bowlus et al. (2001).
18
As noted above the reported statistics are weighted by the 2002 cross-section sample weights.
19
When reading the values reported in rows 3 to 7, it is important to keep in mind that spells
may be censored at different dates for two reasons. First, the estimation sample is from unbalanced
panel data. Second, the second spell inevitably has a shorter sample window than the first spell.
17
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Table 1: Summary Statistics from the Estimation Sample

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Natives
3649
0.053
5.06

Number of observation
Fraction of individuals initially unemployed
Mean unemployment duration (in month)
Fraction of censored spells
among unemployment spells
0.15
Mean job duration (in month)
35.59
Fraction of censored spells
among job spells
0.75
Fraction of completed job spells
ending with a job-to-job transition
0.40
Mean monthly earnings
4021.24
Mean monthly wage accepted
out of unemployment
2907.32

Immigrants
228
0.134
6.84
0.07
30.21
0.70
0.23
3510.50
2463.59

natives, the corresponding number for immigrants was less than a quarter.
The descriptive statistics suggest that immigrants are facing different search frictions with longer unemployment durations and lower job-to-job transition rates. Immigrants also have much higher unemployment rates and shorter job durations. Differences in job offer arrival rates alone may readily account for higher unemployment
rates, but may have more difficulty in simultaneously explaining the lower job-to-job
transition rates. Immigrants may also be facing higher job destruction rates. Therefore, in what follows, we also estimate a model specification that allows for different
job destruction rates for the two groups.20 This improves the model fit substantially.
There is a sizable gap in monthly earnings between the two groups. As shown
in row 8, the mean monthly earnings for immigrant was $3510.50 as opposed to
$4021.24 for natives, yielding roughly a $500 earnings gap. Consistent with the job
search model with on-the-job search, the mean monthly earnings out of unemployment is lower than the mean monthly earnings for both groups. There is a $443.73
earnings gap in the mean accepted earnings level between natives and immigrants.
20
The job destruction rate is not allowed to change when immigrants assimilate in the model. That
is, the job offer arrival rates change but immigrants continue to face a higher job destruction rate.
This is partly done to match the observed data, but also for simplicity in solving the equilibrium
wage offer distribution. In addition, it is not clear that changes in the job destruction process should
be part of assimilation due to learning about how to search more effectively.
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This gap is quite large and is incompatible with the modeling assumptions that natives and immigrants face the same offer distribution and accept all offers. However,
the standard deviations (134.14 and 259.32 for natives and immigrants, respectively)
are rather large because of the small numbers of observations.

4
4.1

Estimation Results
Parameter Estimates

We follow Bowlus et al. (2001) in determining the number of firm types Q. Their
method yields Q = 7 for our estimation sample. Levels beyond seven yielded no
further improvements in the likelihood and productivity parameter estimates that
were substantially higher at the top. In addition, the estimated search parameters
were stable once the number of firm type was increased to this level.
The estimation results are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Table 2 presents the
estimated values for the search parameters. The first column shows the estimation
results with both natives and immigrants facing a common job destruction rate, and
the second column shows the estimation results with natives and immigrants facing
job destruction rates of δ1 and δ1m , respectively. The parameter estimates reveal a
large difference between δ1 and δ1m , though δ1m is not precisely estimated. Allowing the
job destruction rates to differ between the two groups results in an improvement in
the log-likelihood value and fits the observed duration and transition data better. In
the following discussion, therefore, we focus on the parameter estimates with separate
job destruction rates.21
The estimate for λ0 shows that receiving a job offer is a fairly frequent event for native workers during unemployment with an implied mean unemployment duration of
6.4 months. In contrast, the job offer arrival rate while employed and job destruction
rate are estimated to be very low for natives. The ratio of λ1 and δ1 gives a measure
of the expected number of job offers during an employment spell and is often used
21

Once we allow for different job destruction rates for the two groups, the propositions stated
in Section 2 need to be modified because they rely on the assumption of common job destruction
rate. However, if δ1 < δ1m , the result presented in Proposition 3 remains intact and the earnings
distribution of natives first-order stochastically dominates the one for immigrants. In contrast,
in Proposition 4 Gn (w, a) and Gm (w, a) will have different limits with respect to a. As a result,
earnings convergence will be reduced such that the limit of Gn (w, a) will still first-order stochastically
dominate the one for Gm (w, a).
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates: Event Arrival Rates
Parameter

Common job
Separate job
destruction rate destruction rates
δ2 ∗
0.0024
0.0024
∗
µ
0.2120
0.2120
λ0
0.1556
0.1546
(0.0094)
(0.0094)
λ1
0.0089
0.0086
(0.0010)
(0.0010)
δ1
0.0047
0.0044
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
δ1m
0.0075
(0.0017)
α0
0.6288
0.6471
(0.1927)
(0.2100)
α1
0.0735
0.0702
(0.1146)
(0.1453)
η
0.0055
0.0064
(0.0008)
(0.0010)
Log-likelihood
−37402.59
−37391.24
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are presented
in parentheses.
∗
Values assigned outside estimation

as a measure of search frictions. It is also a measure of how much earnings growth
the model will generate as individuals move up the job ladder through on-the-job
search. For the natives, this ratio is 1.98, which is higher than the value found for
Canada in Bowlus (1998), but by international comparisons is relatively low.22 Given
the relatively low unemployment rate and high censoring rate of job spells observed
in data, these low values can be expected.23
22

The fact that our ratio is higher than that in Bowlus (1998) is not surprising given our estimation
sample contains more educated Canadians. However, in both cases the ratio for Canada is low
compared to other countries. For example, the value estimated for U.S. males with educational
attainment comparable to those in our analysis sample ranges from 1.75 to 4.62 (Bowlus and Seitz
(2000) and Flinn (2002)).
23
In order to examine the effect of the high job censoring rate on the parameter estimates, we
estimated the model restricting the native worker sample to age 20 to 35, which had a lower job
censoring rate than the original sample. We also attempted a different estimation strategy, used in

21

Table 3: Parameter Estimates: Wage Cuts
Parameter

Common job
Separate job
destruction rate destruction rates
wmin
1315.80
1315.80
(3.19)
(2.92)
wH1
2580.00
2580.00
(433.26)
(452.36)
wH2
3440.00
3440.00
(479.38)
(473.70)
wH3
4000.00
4000.00
(425.22)
(436.20)
wH4
4733.44
4733.44
(500.63)
(525.96)
wH5
5000.00
5000.00
(585.64)
(637.88)
wH6
5825.00
5825.00
(759.34)
(793.43)
wH7
8520.79
8520.79
(0.82)
(0.82)
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are presented
in parentheses.

Although not precisely estimated, the point estimates for α0 and α1 reveal differences in the job search process between natives and newly-arrived immigrants. The
estimates for α0 and λ0 together imply that the job offer arrival rate for immigrants is
0.1002 giving an unemployment duration of 10.0 months for type 1 immigrants. The
estimate for α1 implies that the job offer arrival rate for employed type 1 immigrants
is less than one tenth the native job offer arrival rate on-the-job and one tenth their
own job destruction rate. All of this suggests that type 1 immigrants face substantial
search frictions while employed and are, therefore, much more likely to have their jobs
end with transitions to unemployment than are natives. Once immigrants acquire the
same search parameters as natives, their job offer arrival rate while employed slightly
exceeds their job destruction rate giving a ratio of 1.17.
Bowlus and Seitz (2000), that omits job duration data and relies on the initial unemployment rates
and the transition data at the end of job spells to identify λ1 and δ1 . Although unreported here, in
both cases, the estimates yielded higher values not only for λ1 but also for δ1 resulting in ratios and
earnings growth predictions that were hardly altered.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates: Firm Productivity Levels and Distribution
Parameter

Common job Separate job Parameter Common job Separate job
destruction
destruction
destruction
destruction
rate
rates
rate
rates
p1
5100.91
5113.64
γ1
0.3598
0.3627
(468.10)
(496.40)
(0.1141)
(0.1198)
p2
5517.98
5533.66
γ2
0.6026
0.6057
(545.92)
(594.65)
(0.1146)
(0.1121)
p3
6384.91
6440.80
γ3
0.7281
0.7306
(1031.13)
(1161.29)
(0.0768)
(0.0762)
p4
7645.26
7728.36
γ4
0.8462
0.8478
(1703.17)
(1928.94)
(0.0572)
(0.0573)
p5
9070.35
9188.67
γ5
0.8769
0.8783
(2716.80)
(3292.69)
(0.0410)
(0.0436)
p6
11908.38
12100.86
γ6
0.9354
0.9362
(5897.89)
(6736.32)
(0.0260)
(0.0267)
p7
24989.68
25553.25
γ7
1
1
(8838.72)
(9672.67)
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are presented in parentheses.

The estimate for η is 0.0064, which implies that it takes newly arrived immigrants
13 years to acquire the native search parameters. Interpreted slightly differently, 47%
of a cohort of immigrants who immigrated 10 years previously have acquired native
search parameters.
The finding that search assimilation for immigrants takes, on average, more than a
decade is in line with some of the previous search assimilation findings. For example,
based on their estimation results, Daneshvary et al. (1992) argue that immigrants
reach “information parity” with natives after about 12 years since migration in the
United States.24 In contrast, based on their duration analysis of unemployment,
Frijters et al. (2005) extrapolate that it takes immigrants more than 40 years to
attain the same hazard rate out of unemployment as their native peers in Britain.
Studies taking a human capital approach to assimilation also often find that it
takes immigrants decades to catch up with natives, though a common feature is a
24

Their view is that the amount of information available to workers searching for jobs is related
to the ratio between the actual and potential earnings where potential earnings means the upper
support of the wage offer distribution. They found that this ratio was below natives’ level for newly
arrived immigrants, but it caught up to the same level after roughly 12 years since migration.
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much faster initial rate of catch up. Skuterud and Su (2012), for example, report
results for a sample of recent Canadian immigrants (arrival cohort 1990-2002). These
were compared with similarly aged native workers. In their preferred specification
the initial wage gap of 0.29 log points was more than halved after 8 years, declined
further to year 13, but then remained roughly constant at 0.09 log points thereafter.
Skuterud and Su argue that this pattern of strong decreasing relative returns to host
country experience reflects what might be expected from “language acquisition or
acculturation processes” (p.1124). However, our results indicate that search assimilation may be responsible for much of this convergence and that more conventional
human capital models may overestimate the role of human capital assimilation in not
taking into account search assimilation.
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimates related to the firm productivity distribution
and the resulting wage cuts. The productivity distribution is right skewed with the
lowest two levels accounting for the majority of the productivity distribution. The
implied average monthly productivity level is $7526.56. The large values for the
highest productivity levels, needed to meet the equal-profit condition at the upper
end of the wage distribution, are a common outcome of this model.

4.2

Model Fit

We examine how well the model fits the observed data by comparing the summary
statistics reported in Table 1 with model predictions. When predicting the moments
of the duration and transition data, it is important to account for the fact that our
estimation sample is unbalanced panel data and spells can be censored at different
dates. To control for this issue we simulate a sample of a large number of job histories
matching the survey response outcomes in the estimation sample. One exception to
this is that the predicted values for the earnings outcomes given in row 8 are obtained
by numerically calculating the mean of the offer distribution rather than from the
simulations. The results are presented in Table 5.
The model matches the duration and transition data of natives and immigrants
well overall. It underpredicts the unemployment rates for both groups, and somewhat overpredicts the unemployment durations. Unfortunately the model cannot
match both of these moments since to match the first the job offer arrival rate while
unemployed needs to be lower and to fix the second it needs to be higher.
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Table 5: Predicted Moments from the Estimation Result with Separate Job Destruction Rates for Natives and Immigrants
Natives
Observed Predicted
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Fraction of individuals
initially unemployed
Mean unemployment
duration (in month)
Fraction of censored spells
among all unemployment spells
Mean job duration (in month)
Fraction of censored spells
among all job spells
Fraction of completed job spells
ending with a job-to-job transition
Mean monthly earnings
Mean monthly wage accepted
out of unemployment

Immigrants
Observed Predicted

0.053

0.042

0.134

0.072

5.06

5.83

6.84

7.37

0.15
35.59

0.10
35.87

0.07
30.21

0.14
32.33

0.75

0.74

0.70

0.69

0.40
4021.24

0.41
4063.54

0.23
3510.50

0.20
3676.74

2907.73

3341.87

2463.59

3341.87

Not surprisingly, as shown in Figure 1, the predicted distribution of natives’ earnings fits the observed distribution very closely. The model produces an earnings gap
between natives and immigrants of approximately $390, which captures three quarters
of the observed gap. The same figure shows that the predicted earnings distribution
for immigrants lies slightly to the right of the observed distribution reflecting the
unexplained portion of the observed earnings gap.
Row 8 of Table 5 shows that the model is having a difficult time fitting the offer distribution, substantially overpredicting it. The offer distribution is identified
from earnings observations accepted out of unemployment and the number of such
observations is modest in the data. Therefore, fitting the data in this dimension does
not seem to have influenced the estimation substantially. The difficulty in capturing
enough difference between the earnings and offer distributions reflects the estimated
low value of λ1 /δ1 , and also points to the model’s problem in generating sufficient
earnings growth. This suggests that the model is missing important earnings growth
mechanisms. The most obvious factor omitted by the model is human capital accumulation, and enriching the model in this direction is an interesting avenue for
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Figure 1: Observed and Predicted Earnings Distributions for Natives and Immigrants

future work.25 Finally, the observed gap in accepted wages out of unemployment
between natives and immigrants may reflect productivity differences between the two
groups. Therefore, it may be important to investigate whether there are separate
labour markets for natives and immigrants.26

4.3

Implications of Estimation Results For Earnings Assimilation

The estimation results imply that it takes newly arrived immigrants, on average, 13
years to acquire the native search parameters. We examine the implications of this
estimated job search assimilation process for immigrants’ life cycle earnings growth.
In Figure 2, the solid-lined curve shows the predicted mean monthly earnings profile
of immigrants since migration, relative to the earnings level in the first year since
migration. On average, immigrants are predicted to experience about 5% earnings
growth in the first 10 years since migration, and about 18% earnings growth over 40
years since migration. The earnings profile is S-shaped, originally exhibiting slower
25

The addition of human capital can substantially complicate the equilibrium solution to the
model.
26
This difference may also be aggravated by our assumption of a common minimum wage.
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Figure 2: Predicted Immigrants’ Earnings Growth

earnings growth because of the lower rates of job offer arrival when they are new to
the host country.
Indeed, the estimates reveal that newly arrived immigrants search under a very
low job offer arrival rate while employed. This limits their chances of finding better
paying jobs. If immigrants could search as effectively as natives sooner, they would
experience a faster earnings growth. The broken lined curve in the same figure shows
a counterfactual scenario in which η is doubled to 0.0127, halving the average length
of time needed to spend in the host country before acquiring the native job search
efficiency. The counterfactual earnings profile shows faster and larger earnings growth,
and produces 18% growth in 30 years since migration.
Figure 3 shows predicted earnings profiles of immigrants entering the host country
at different ages. These profiles are measured relative to their native counterparts,
with an assumption that native workers enter the labour market at age 20. The
earnings are followed until immigrants reach age 65. For each age group, the initial
earnings gap reflects the natives’ advantage of having more time operating in the host
country labour market. For any age group in Figure 3, the relative earnings decline
initially for two reasons. First, newly arrived immigrants search with lower job search
efficiency. Second, natives are experiencing robust earnings growth during their early
years in the labour market. As immigrants age, their earnings level converges to a
27

Figure 3: Predicted Immigrant Earnings Relative to Native Earnings

level about 8% below the native earnings, failing to achieve the earnings parity. This
failure of earnings convergence is because of the immigrants’ higher job destruction
rate. The same exercise is conducted assuming that immigrants face the native job
destruction rate, and this counterfactual experiment produces the relative earnings
profile in Figure 4. In this counterfactual scenario, immigrants close the earnings
gap more than in the previous case. However, even as they turn 65 they have yet to
achieve earnings parity.
It is also interesting to ask how natives are affected by having to compete with
immigrants in the same labour market. The presence of new immigrants produces
an equilibrium effect, which reflects a change in firms’ wage posting strategies. They
search at lower job offer arrival rates, resulting in an increase in the fraction of workers
with less propensity to make a job-to-job transition. This leads to an increase in firms’
monopsony power in the model, allowing them to post lower wages and shift the offer
distribution to the left in equilibrium.27 Without immigrants, the firms’ monopsony
power would be reduced, and the equilibrium wage offer distribution would shift to
the right.28 To look at this effect on natives’ earnings, we solve the equilibrium with
27

See Burdett and Mortensen (1998) for a discussion on how workers’ likelihood to make a jobto-job transition as opposed to a job-to-unemployment transition affects the monopsony power of
firms.
28
We do not account for the effect of the immigrant labour force on native job offer arrival rates
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Figure 4: Counterfactual Immigrant Earnings Relative to Native Earnings

µ = 0, and compare the native earnings distribution under this equilibrium with the
one under the estimated parameters. These distributions are presented in Figure 5.
The mean difference in these two distributions are $175.88, implying a 4% reduction
in the mean earnings of natives due to the presence of immigrants in the labour
market.

5

Concluding Remarks

Immigrant assimilation is a major issue in many countries. There is a very large
literature that studies assimilation primarily through a human capital framework.
While a variety of these studies, going back to Chiswick (1978), refers to immigrants
accumulating host country specific knowledge as well as skills following migration,
the accumulation of knowledge of how the host country labour market works and
how to search efficiently has received relatively little attention. In this paper, we
use a search model to study assimilation via this potentially important host-country
specific knowledge. Specifically, we present and estimate an equilibrium search model
of immigrants operating in the same labour market as natives using Canadian panel
data.
and any resulting equilibrium effects.
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Figure 5: Predicted Native Earnings Distributions

Assimilation via acquisition of knowledge of how the host country labour market
works and how to search efficiently in it takes place in the model by having immigrants initially face a (potentially) lower arrival rate of job offers, and allowing them
to acquire the same job offer arrival rate according to a stochastic process. The
estimation results show substantial differences in job offer arrival rates between natives and newly arrived immigrants, as well as a difference in the job destruction rate
between natives and immigrants. These differences are able to account for three quarters of the observed earnings differential between natives and immigrants. The results
also imply that it takes immigrants, on average, 13 years to acquire the same search
parameters as natives. The job search assimilation process generates 18% earnings
growth for immigrants in 40 years since migration. The parameter estimates reveal
that newly arrived immigrants have a hard time generating earnings growth because
of their very low job offer arrival rate while employed. If the time needed to acquire
the native job search process were halved, the same 18% earnings growth would be
achieved 10 years sooner than the estimates predict. This has important implications
for policy initiatives to encourage immigrant assimilation.
Although the model is able to fit various dimensions of the observed data well,
it is at odds with the observed data in some dimensions. Particularly, the model is
not able to capture the difference in accepted wages out of unemployment between
30

natives and immigrants and it has difficulty generating sufficient earnings growth.
These two findings may point to productivity differences and the role of human capital
accumulation, and enriching the model in this dimension is an interesting avenue for
future research. In particular, given the large previous literature emphasizing the
role of human capital accumulation in immigrant assimilation, it is important to
understand the relative roles of human capital and search in this process.
Finally, given the modest number of immigrant observations in the estimation
sample, the estimates pertaining to the immigrant job search parameters are not
precisely estimated. In addition, it was not possible to allow for initial job offer
arrival rates to depend on potentially relevant factors, such as the degree of similarity
between the labour markets in the source and host countries. An important next step
is to incorporate heterogeneity in initial Canadian Labour market knowledge through
the use of alternative data sources such as the LSIC.

Appendix A

Proofs of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 1
Accounting for the reservation wage property of type 1 immigrant worker’s problem,
equation (4) can be rewritten as
rVmu

Z

w

= b + α 0 λ0



Vme (x) − Vmu dF (x) + η Vnu − Vmu − δ2 Vmu .

Rm

Analogously equation (5) can be rewritten as
rVme (w)

Z
= w + α 1 λ1

w



Vme (x) − Vme (w) dF (x) + ηI(w ≥ Rn ) Vne (w) − Vme (w)
w


+ ηI(w < Rn ) Vnu − Vme (w) + δ1 Vmu − Vme (w) − δ2 Vme (w).

The above equation yields
d
1 + ηI(w > Rn ) dw
Vne (w)
d e
Vm (w) =
dw
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (w)
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(12)

where Vme (w) is differentiable.29 Equation (2) yields
1
d e
Vn (w) =
.
dw
ρ + λ1 F (w)

(13)

These two equations, together with Vme (Rm ) = Vmu and Vne (Rn ) = Vne , yield
Z

w



Vme (x)−Vme (Rm ) dF(x) + ηI(Rm > Rn ) Vne (Rn )−Vne (Rm )

Rm =b + (α0 λ0 −α1 λ1 )
Rm
w

Z

d
F (x) Vme (x)dx + ηI(Rm > Rn )
=b + (α0 λ0 −α1 λ1 )
dw
Rm

Z

Rn

Rm

d e
V (x)dx,
dw n
(14)

where the second term is obtained by integration by parts.
Using equation (12), the integral in the second term on the right-hand side of
equation (14) is given by
Z w
d e
F (x)
F (x) Vm (x)dx =
dx
dw
Rm
Rm ρ+η+α1 λ1 F (x)
Z w
Z w
d
d
ηF (x) dw
ηF (x) dw
Vne (x)
Vne (x)
+ I(Rm < Rn )
dx + I(Rm ≥ Rn )
dx. (15)
Rn ρ+η+α1 λ1 F (x)
Rm ρ+η+α1 λ1 F (x)

Z

w

The integral in the third term on the right-hand side of equation (15) can be split
into two terms as follows:
d
ηF (x) dw
Vne (x)

w

Z

Rm

Z

ρ+η+α1 λ1 F (x)

w

=
Rn

d
ηF (x) dw
Vne (x)

ρ+η+α1 λ1 F (x)

Z

Rm

dx −
Rn

d
ηF (x) dw
Vne (x)

ρ+η+α1 λ1 F (x)

dx.

Thus equation (15) can be rearranged to
Z

w

Rm

F (x)Vme (x)dx

Z w
F (x)
ηF (x)Vne (x)
dx +
dx
=
Rm ρ+η+α1 λ1 F (x)
Rn ρ+η+α1 λ1 F (x)
Z Rm
ηF (x)Vne (x)
−I(Rm ≥ Rn )
dx
Rn ρ+η+α1 λ1 F (x)
Z

w

Then substituting the above expression into equation (14) and a few algebraic steps
yield the desired result.
29

From equation (5), it is clear that Vme (w) has a kink at Rn .
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Proof of Lemma 1
Define function H(w) by
w̄

Z

Z w
η
(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F (x)
(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F (x)
dx +
dx
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (w)
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x) ρ + λ1 F (x)
Z w
ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (x)
η
− I(w > Rn )
dx. (16)
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x) ρ + λ1 F (x)

H(w) = b − w +
w

By Proposition 1, Rm solves equation H(Rm ) = 0. Function H(w) can be rewritten
as
Z

w̄

H(w) = b − w̄ +
w

Z w
ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (x)
(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F (x)
η
dx +
dx
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x)
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x) ρ + λ1 F (x)
Z w
η
ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (x)
dx. (17)
− I(w > Rn )
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x) ρ + λ1 F (x)

Note that H(w) is continuous. It is also decreasing because
H 0 (w) = −

ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (w)
<0
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (w)

for w < Rn , and
H 0 (w) = −

ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (w) ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (w)
η
−
<0
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (w) ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (w) ρ + λ1 F (w)

for w > Rn . Therefore Rn > Rm if and only if H(Rn ) < H(Rm ) = 0.
Evaluate H(w) at Rn :
Z w
ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (x)
(α0 λ0 − α1 λ1 )F (x)
η
dx +
dx
H(Rn ) = b − w̄ +
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x)
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x) ρ + λ1 F (x)
Z w̄
Z w̄
ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (x) η + ρ + λ1 F (x)
η
= b − w̄ +
dx −
dx. (18)
ρ + λ1 F (x)
Rn ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x)
Rn ρ + λ1 F (x)
Z

w̄

Now equation (3) can be rewritten as
Z

w

b−w =−
Rn

ρ + λ0 F (w)
dx.
ρ + λ1 F (x)
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(19)

Substituting equation (19) into equation (18) yields
Z

w̄

H(Rn ) =
Rn

ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (x) η + ρ + λ1 F (x)
dx −
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x) ρ + λ1 F (x)

Z

w̄

Rn

η + ρ + λ0 F (x)
dx.
ρ + λ1 F (x)

Hence Rn > Rm if and only if
Z

w̄

Rn




η + ρ + λ0 F (x) ρ + η + α0 λ0 F (x) η + ρ + λ1 F (x)
−
dx > 0,
ρ + λ1 F (x)
ρ + η + α1 λ1 F (x) ρ + λ1 F (x)

which is the desired result.

Proof of Proposition 2
Given α1 < 1 and η > 0, using equations (8) and (9), we can show that
Gm1 (w) =

F (w)
F (w)
F (w)
>
>
= Gn (w),
α 1 λ1
λ1
1 + δ+η F (w)
1 + δ+η F (w)
1 + λδ1 F (w)

which yields Gm1 (w) > Gn (w) for any w ∈ [w, w]. This establishes the first-order
stochastic dominance of Gn (w) over Gm1 (w).
Next, using equations (8) and (10), we can show that

Gm2 (w) =

δ2 α0 (δ + λ0 )α1 λ1 F (w)
1−
δ(α0 δ2 + α0 λ0 + δ + η)(δ + η + α1 λ1 F (w))


Gn (w).

(20)

It is straightforward to show
0≤

δ2 α0 (δ + λ0 )α1 λ1 F (w)
< 1,
δ(α0 δ2 + α0 λ0 + δ + η)(δ + η + α1 λ1 F (w))

which yields Gm2 (w) < Gn (w) for any w ∈ [w, w]. This establishes the first-order
stochastic dominance of Gm2 (w) over Gn (w).

Proof of Proposition 3
Gm (w) is given by
Gm (w) =

Em1 Gm1 (w) + Em2 Gm2 (w)
Em1 + Em2
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(21)

where Em1 and Em2 denote the steady-state measures of employed type 1 and type 2
immigrants, respectively. These two variables are determined by the following steadystate flow analysis.
First, define Um1 and Um2 as the steady-state measures of unemployed type 1
and type 2 immigrants, respectively. Then, Em1 , Em2 , Um1 , and Um2 sum up to the
measure of all immigrant workers:
Um1 + Um2 + Em1 + Em2 = µ.

(22)

Second, type 1 immigrants leave employment at rate δ1 due to job separation, and
at rate δ2 due to permanent exit from the labour market. They may become type 2
immigrants at rate η. This outflow is balanced by the inflow of unemployed type 1
immigrants becoming employed at rate α0 λ0 . Therefore,
(δ1 + δ2 + η)Em1 = α0 λ0 Um1 .

(23)

Third, type 2 immigrants leave unemployment at rate λ0 , and leave the labour market
permanently at rate δ2 . This outflow is balanced by type 1 unemployed immigrants
becoming type 2 at rate η, and type 2 employed immigrants becoming unemployed
at rate δ1 . Therefore,
(λ0 + δ2 )Um2 = ηUm1 + δ1 Em2 .
(24)
Fourth, employed type 2 immigrants become unemployed at rate δ1 , or leave the
labour market permanently at rate δ2 . This outflow is balanced by the inflow of
unemployed type 2 immigrants becoming employed at rate λ0 and type 1 immigrants
becoming type 2 immigrants. Therefore,
(δ1 + δ2 )Em2 = λ0 Um2 + ηEm1 .

(25)

Solving equations (22) - (25), we obtain Em1 and Em2 , respectively, as
δ2 α0 λ0
µ,
(η + δ2 )(α0 λ0 + η + δ)

(26)

ηλ0 (δ + η + α0 λ0 + α0 δ2 )
µ.
(η + δ2 )(δ + λ0 )(α0 λ0 + η + δ)

(27)

Em1 =
and
Em2 =
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Substituting equations (9), (10), (26), and (27) into equation (21) to obtain the
expression for Gm (w), and then comparing the result with Gn (w) in equation (8)
yields the following relationship between Gm (w) and Gn (w):
Gm (w) =

δ2 (δ + λ0 )(δ + η)α0 λ0 (1 − α1 )λ1 F (w)

1+
δ (δ + η + λ0 )(λ0 δ2 α0 + ηλ0 (δ + η + α0 λ0 ))(δ + η + λ1 F (w)

!
Gn (w).

Since α1 < 1, then
δ2 (δ + λ0 )(δ + η)α0 λ0 (1 − α1 )λ1 F (w)
 > 0,
δ (δ + η + λ0 )(λ0 δ2 α0 + ηλ0 (δ + η + α0 λ0 ))(δ + η + λ1 F (w)
which yields
Gm (w) > Gn (w)
for any w ∈ [w, w]. Thus, Gn (w) first-order stochastically dominates Gm (w).

Proof of Proposition 4
In order to establish Proposition 4, we solve a number of differential equations. The
outline of this proof is as follows. First, we show the limit of Gn (w, a). Then we do
the same for Gm (w, a), and show that it has the same limit.
Step 1
Let En (a) and Un (a) denote the mass of natives of age a who are employed and
unemployed, respectively. At any given time, employed workers become unemployed
at rate δ1 and leave the labour market at rate δ2 , and unemployed workers become
employed at rate λ0 , and leave the labour market at rate δ2 . Moreover, due to
the steady-state assumption, all cohorts have identical aggregate employment and
unemployment profiles at all ages. Exploiting the steady-state assumption, Un (a)
and En (a) are given by the following system of differential equations
U̇n (a) = −(λ0 + δ2 )Un (a) + δ1 En (a)
Ėn (a) = λ0 Un (a) − (δ1 + δ2 )En (a).
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Furthermore, all workers enter the labour market initially unemployed, implying
R
En (0) = 0, while the aggregate condition yields (Un (a)+En (a))da = 1−µ. Together
with these conditions, the system of the these differential equations yields

δ1 δ2 −δ2 a
λ0 δ2 −(λ0 +δ1 +δ2 )a
(1 − µ),
Un (a) =
e
+
e
λ 0 + δ1
λ 0 + δ1


λ0 δ2 −δ2 a
λ0 δ2 −(λ0 +δ1 +δ2 )a
En (a) =
(1 − µ).
e
−
e
λ0 + δ1
λ0 + δ1


(28)
(29)

Let Mn (w, a) be the steady-state stock of natives of age a earning wage w or less.
Clearly Mn (w, 0) = 0. Job-to-job transitions and unemployment-to-job transitions
produce the following differential equation regarding Mn (w, a):
dMn (w, a)
= −(δ1 + δ2 + λ1 F (w))Mn (w, a) + λ0 F (w)Un (a).
da
The differential equation shows that the change in Mn (w, a) with respect to a consists
of two parts. The first part is the outflow from Mn (w, a) due to on-the-job search,
job destruction and permanent exit from the labour market. The second part is the
inflow of unemployed natives finding wage offers of w or less. The general solution to
this differential equation is given by
Mn (w, a) = e

−(δ+λ1 F (w))a

Z

(δ+λ1 F (w))a

[e


λ0 F (w)Un (a)]da + C

(30)

where C is a constant to be determined by the condition Mn (w, 0) = 0. Together
with equation (28), equation (30) gives
δ1 δ2
e−δ2 a
e−(λ0 +δ)a
λ 0 δ2
Mn (w, a) =(1 − µ)λ0 F (w)
−
λ0 + δ1 δ1 + λ1 F (w) λ0 + δ1 λ0 − λ1 F (w)


+e

−(δ+λ1 F (w))a


(31)

C.

After pinning down C by the condition Mn (w, 0) = 0, equation (31) can be rewritten
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as
"
Mn (w, a) = (1 − µ)λ0 F (w)

δ1 δ2 e−δ2 a − e−(δ+λ1 F (w))a
λ 0 + δ1
δ1 + λ1 F (w)
#
λ0 δ2 e−(λ0 +δ)a − e−(δ+λ1 F (w))a
. (32)
−
λ 0 + δ1
λ0 − λ1 F (w)

The age-dependent earnings distribution of natives, given by Gn (w, a), is
Gn (w, a) =

Mn (w, a)
.
En (a)

Using equation (29) and (32), we obtain
Gn (w, a) =

δ1 F (w) 1 − e−(λ1 F (w)+δ1 )a
λ1 F (w) + δ1 1 − e−(λ0 +δ1 )a
+

λ0 F (w) e−(λ1 F (w)+δ1 )a − e−(λ0 +δ1 )a
,
1 − e−(λ0 +δ1 )a
λ0 − λ1 F (w)

and therefore
lim Gn (w, a) =

a→∞

δ1 F (w)
.
δ1 + λ1 F (w)

Step 2
The age profile of the earnings distribution of immigrants can be derived similarly.
Let Mmy (w, a) be the steady-state stock of type y immigrants of age a earning wage
w or less. For type 1 immigrants, the change in Mm1 (w, a) with respect to a comes
from the outflow of workers due to job destruction, permanent exit, on-the-job search
and type change, and the inflow of unemployed workers accepting wage w or less:
dMm1 (w, a)
= −(δ1 + δ2 + η + α1 λ1 F (w))Mm1 (w, a) + α0 λ0 F (w)Um1 (a).
da

(33)

The above differential equation can be solved with the condition Mm1 (w, a) = 0. For
type 2 immigrants, the change in Mm2 (w, a) with respect to a comes from the outflow
of workers due to job destruction, permanent exit and on-the-job search, the inflow
from the pool of employed type 1 immigrants due to type change, and the inflow of
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unemployed workers accepting wage w or less:
dMm2 (w, a)
= −(δ1 + δ2 + λ1 F (w))Mm2 (w, a) + ηMm1 (w, a) + λ0 F (w)Um2 (a). (34)
da
The above differential equation can be solved with the condition Mm2 (w, a) = 0.
The evolution of unemployment and employment measures of immigrants by age
is given by


 


U̇m1 (a)
−(α0 λ0 + η + δ2 )
δ1
0
0
Um1 (a)

 


Ėm1 (a) 
 Em1 (a)
α
λ
−(η
+
δ)
0
0
0
0
 



U̇ (a) = 
 U (a)
η
0
−(λ
+
δ
)
δ
0
2
1   m2
 m2  

Ėm2 (a)
0
η
λ0
−δ
Em2 (a)
The system of differential equation has the solution


 
0 0
Um1 (a)

 
Em1 (a)  0 0

 
U (a) =  δ
 m2   1 1
λ0 −1
Em2 (a)

δ1
α0 λ0




c1 e−δ2 a


  c2 e−(λ0 +δ)a 



−(δ +η)a 
− η+(α0η−1)λ0 
  c3 e 2

η
−(α0 λ0 +η+δ)a
c4 e
η+(α0 −1)λ0
1
−1

δ1 (δ1 +α0 λ0 −η)
η−λ0 −δ1
(δ1 +α0 λ0 )λ0 −α0 λ0 η
η−λ0 −δ1

with constants c1 , c2 , c3 and c4 determined by the following conditions:
Um2 (0) = Em1 (0) = Em2 (0) = 0,
and

Z

∞

(Um1 (a) + Um2 (a) + Em1 (a) + Em2 (a))da = µ.
0

These conditions yield
c1 =

δ2
µ,
δ1 + λ 0

c3 =

δ2
µ,
δ1 + α0 λ0

c4 =

α0 λ0 δ2
µ,
δ1 + α 0 λ 0

and
c2 =

ηλ0 (α0 λ0 + δ1 )(η − λ0 − α0 δ1 )
µ.
(λ0 + δ1 )(η − λ0 − δ1 )(η + (α0 − 1)λ0 )
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The general solution to differential equation (33) is given by
−(α1 λ1 F (w))a

Mm1 (w, a) = e



Z h
i
(α1 λ1 F (w)+δ+η)a
Um1 (a)e
α0 λ0 F (w)
da + C .

(35)

The integral on the right-hand side of equation (35) can be rearranged to
Z

(α1 λ1 F (w)+δ+η)a

Um1 (a)e

Z h
i
c3 δ1 e(α1 λ1 F (w)+δ1 )a + c4 e(α1 λ1 F (w)−α0 λ0 )a da
da =
c3 δ1 e(α1 λ1 F (w)+δ1 )a c4 e(α1 λ1 F (w)−α0 λ0 )a
+
=
.
α1 λ1 F (w) + δ1
α1 λ1 F (w) − α0 λ0

Therefore,

c4 e−(η+δ2 )a
c3 δ1 e−(η+δ2 )a
+
+ Ce−(α1 λ1 F (w)+η+δ)a .
Mm1 (w, a) = α0 λ0 F (w)
α1 λ1 F (w) + δ1 α1 λ1 F (w) − α0 λ0
(36)
Using Mm1 (w, 0) = 0 to solve for C, and substituting the result into equation (36)
yields


"
Mm1 (w, a) = α0 λ0 F (w) c3 δ1

e−(η+δ2 )a − e−(α1 λ1 F (w)+η+δ)a
α1 λ1 F (w) + δ1
#
e−(η+δ2 )a − e−(α1 λ1 F (w)+η+δ)a
+c4
.
α1 λ1 F (w) − α0 λ0

The general solution to equation (34) then yields
−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a

Z

Mm2 (w, a) = e

−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a

(ηMm1 (w, a) + λ0 F (w)Um2 (a))e

(λ1 F (w)+δ)a


da + C2

Z

Mm1 (w, a)e(λ1 F (w)+δ)a da
Z
−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a
+ λ0 F (w)e
Um2 (a))e(λ1 F (w)+δ)a da + C2 e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a .

= ηe

(37)
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The integrals on the right-hand side of equation (37) can be written as
Z

"
#
(λ1 F (w)+δ1 −η)a
((1−α1 )λ1 F (w)−η)a
α
λ
F
(w)c
δ
e
e
0 0
3 1
−
Mm1 (w, a)e(λ1 F (w)+δ)a da =
α1 λ1 F (w) + δ1 λ1 F (w) + δ1 − η (1 − α1 )λ1 F (w) − η
"
#
α0 λ0 F (w)c4
e(λ1 F (w)−α0 λ0 −η)a
e((1−α1 )λ1 F (w)−η)a
+
−
,
α1 λ1 F (w) − α0 λ0 λ1 F (w) − α0 λ0 − η (1 − α1 )λ1 F (w) − η

and
Z

λ1 F (w)+δ)a

Um2 (a)e
+ c3

e(λ1 F (w)−λ0 )a
e(λ1 F (w)+δ1 )a
+ c2
da = c1 δ1
λ1 F (w) + δ1
λ1 F (w) − λ0

e(λ1 F (w)−α0 λ0 −η)a
δ1 (δ1 + α0 λ0 − η) e(λ1 F (w)+δ1 −η)a
c4 η
−
.
η − λ0 − δ1
λ1 F (w) + δ1 − η η + (α0 − 1)λ0 λ1 F (w) − α0 λ0 − η

Using Mm2 (w, 0) = 0 to solve for C2 in equation (37), and substituting the result into
the same equation yields
Mm2 (w, a)
#
"
ηα0 λ0 F (w)c3 δ1 e−(η+δ)a − e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a e−(α1 λ1 F (w)+η+δ)a − e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a
−
=
α1 λ1 F (w) + δ1
λ1 F (w) + δ1 − η
(1 − α1 )λ1 F (w) − η
#
"
ηα0 λ0 F (w)c4
e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ)a − e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a e−(α1 λ1 F (w)+η+δ)a − e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a
+
−
α1 λ1 F (w) − α0 λ0
λ1 F (w) − α0 λ0 − η
(1 − α1 )λ1 F (w) − η
+λ0 F (w)c1 δ1
+λ0 F (w)c3
−λ0 F (w)

e−δ2 a − e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a
e−(λ0 +δ)a − e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a
+ λ0 F (w)c2
λ1 F (w) + δ1
λ1 F (w) − λ0

δ1 (δ1 + α0 λ0 − η) e−(δ2 +η)a − e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a
η − λ0 − δ1
λ1 F (w) + δ1 − η

c4 η
e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ)a − e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)a
.
η + (α0 − 1)λ0
λ1 F (w) − α0 λ0 − η

The age-dependent earnings distribution of immigrants, given by Gm (w, a), is
Gm (w, a) =

Mm1 (w, a) + Mm2 (w, a)
.
Em1 (a) + Em2 (a)

(38)

To show that Gm (w, a) converges to the same distribution as Gn (w, a), rewrite equa-
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tion (38) as
Gm (w, a) =

eδ2 a [Mm1 (w, a) + Mm2 (w, a)]
eδ2 a Mm1 (w, a) + eδ2 a Mm2 (w, a)
.
=
eδ2 a [Em1 (a) + Em2 (a)]
eδ2 a Em1 (a) + eδ2 a Em2 (a)

It is then straightforward to show the limits of the terms appearing in both the
numerator and denominator.
lim eδ2 a Mm1 (w, a) = 0,

a→∞

lim eδ2 a Mm2 (w, a) =

a→∞

lim eδ2 a Em1 (a) = 0,

a→∞

λ0 c1 δ1 F (w)
,
λ1 F (w) + δ1

lim eδ2 a Em2 (a) = λ0 c1 .

a→∞

Therefore we obtain the desired result.
lim Gm (w, a) =

a→∞

Appendix B

δ1 F (w)
.
λ1 F (w) + δ1

Likelihood Contributions

For all individuals in the data set, the likelihood contributions account for their
initially observed employment outcomes, the duration of the initial spell, and if applicable, the wages earned and transition made at the end of the spell. In addition
to these pieces of information, the characteristics of the next spell also enter into
the likelihood if the initial spell is an unemployment spell, or if it is a job spell that
ends with a transition to an unemployment spell. More specifically, a list of variables
used in the likelihood can be written as xi = (w1 , d1 , c1 , t1 , d2 , c2 ) for those initially
employed, where w1 and d1 represent the wage earned and duration of the initial job,
c1 takes on a value of 1 if the initial spell is censored and 0 otherwise, and t1 takes
on a value of 1 if the initial spell ends with a transition to a new job, and 0 if it
ends with a transition to unemployment. If the initial spell ends with a transition
to unemployment, d2 represents the duration of the second spell, with c2 being the
indicator for censoring of the second spell. For those initially unemployed, xi is given
as xi = (d1 , c1 , w2 , d2 , c2 , t2 ) with d1 and c1 representing the duration and censoring outcome of the unemployment spell, respectively, w2 , d2 and c2 representing the
wage, duration and censoring outcome of the following job spell, respectively, and t2
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representing the type of transition made if the second spell is complete.
The likelihood contributions Ln (θ; xi ) and Lm2 (θ; xi ) have the familiar structure in
the job search literature because the search behaviours of the corresponding groups
are standard. In contrast, derivation of Lm1 (θ; xi ) involves accounting for possible
changes in the search process among workers, and requires more careful presentation.
We discuss derivations for these three in turn.
Derivation of Ln (θ; xi ) and Lm2 (θ; xi )
In the steady state, a native worker is employed with probability λ0 /(λ0 + δ), and the
distribution of wages earned on that job is given by Gn (w1 ). Given the initial wage
w, the residual duration of the first job spell follows the exponential distribution with
parameter (λ1 F (w) + δ). At the end of a job spell, a native worker makes a jobto-job transition with probability λ1 F (w)/(λ1 F (w) + δ), or a job-to-unemployment
transition with probability δ1 /(λ1 F (w) + δ). The duration of a new unemployment
spell follows the exponential distribution with parameter (λ0 + δ2 ) and ends with a
transition to a new job with probability λ0 /(λ0 + δ2 ). Gathering all the components
together, the likelihood contribution for native-born individuals initially employed is
given by

1−c1
λ0
gn (w)e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)d1 (λ1 F (w))t1 (δ1 e−(λ0 +δ2 )d2 λ01−c2 )1−t1
λ0 + δ
where gn (w) denotes the density of Gn (w).
The probability that a native individual is unemployed in the steady-state is
δ/(λ0 + δ). The residual unemployment duration follows the exponential distribution
with parameter (λ0 +δ2 ), and the probability that an unemployment spell ends with a
transition to a new job as opposed to a permanent exit from the labour market is given
by λ0 /(λ0 + δ2 ). The distribution of wages on new jobs is given by F (w). The duration of a new job follows the exponential distribution with parameter (λ1 F (w) + δ),
and ends with a transition to a job spell with probability λ1 F (w)/(λ1 F (w) + δ) or
with a job-to-unemployment transition with probability δ1 /(λ1 F (w) + δ). Therefore,
the likelihood contribution for native workers initially unemployed takes the form
h
i1−c1

δ
1−t2
−(λ0 +δ2 )d1
−(λ1 F (w)+δ)d2
t2 1−c2
e
λ0 f (w)e
δ1 (λ1 F (w))
.
λ0 + δ
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The likelihood contribution for type 2 immigrants is similar to the natives’ since
they share the same search process. Ln (θ, xi ) and Lm2 (θi , xi ) differ due to differences
in the probabilities of the initial employment status and earned wage. The probability
that a type 2 immigrant worker is employed at any instance is given by
λ0 (δ + η + α0 λ0 + α0 δ2 )
,
(λ0 + δ)(δ + η + α0 λ0 )
and the distribution of the wage earned is given by Gm2 (w) with its density denoted by
gm2 (w). The steady-state probability that a type 2 immigrant worker is unemployed
is given by
δ((δ + η) + δ1 α0 λ0 )
.
(λ0 + δ)(δ + η + α0 λ0 )
Thus, Lm2 (θ, xi ) takes the form

1−c1
λ0 (δ + η + α0 λ0 + α0 δ2 )
2 1−t1
gm2 (w)e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)d1 (λ1 F (w))t1 (δ1 e−(λ0 +δ2 )d2 λ1−c
)
0
(λ0 + δ)(δ + η + α0 λ0 )
for those initially employed, or
i1−c1

δ((δ + η) + δ1 α0 λ0 ) −(λ0 +δ2 )d1 h
1−t2
t2 1−c2
−(λ1 F (w)+δ)d2
e
λ0 f (w)e
δ1 (λ1 F (w))
(λ0 + δ)(δ + η + α0 λ0 )
for those initially unemployed.
Derivation of Lm1 (θ; xi )
Derivation of Lm1 (θ; xi ) is more involved because of the possibility that type 1 immigrants experience changes in search parameters. It is therefore helpful to introduce
variables reflecting immigrant types upon transitions between spells. The variables,
denoted y1 and y2 , are used to first form the joint probabilities with the observed outcomes, and then integrated out to yield the expression for Lm1 (θ; xi ). This process
results in the following expression of the likelihood contribution of type 1 immigrants
who are initially unemployed:

PU

2
X
y1 =1



"

Pu1 (d1 , y1 , c1 ) f (w)

2
X

#1−c1 
Pj2 (d2 , y2 , c2 |w, y1 )Ptr (t2 |w, y2 )1−c2

y2 =y1
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where PU represents the probability that a type 1 immigrant is unemployed at any
instant in the steady state, i.e., PU = (δ + η)/(δ + η + α0 λ0 ). Component probability
Pu1 (d1 , y1 , c1 ) is the joint probability of the residual unemployment duration, censoring indicator and the ending immigrant type of the first spell. f (w) is the distribution
of accepted wage offers. Pj2 (d2 , y2 , c2 |w, y1 ) is the joint probability of the duration,
censoring outcome and ending immigrant type of the following job spell conditional
on the accepted wage and the starting immigrant type on the job. The last factor,
Ptr (t2 |y2 , w), accounts for the type of transition made at the end of the second spell.
Similarly, for type 1 immigrants seen initially employed, the likelihood contribution takes the form

PE gm1 (w)

2
X





Pj1 (d1 , y1 , c1 |w) Ptr (t1 |w, y1 )

y1 =1

2
X

!1−t1 1−c1 
Pu2 (d2 , y2 , c2 |y1 )





y2 =y1

where PE denotes the probability that a type 1 immigrant is employed at any instant
in the steady state, i.e., PE = α0 λ0 /(δ + η + α0 λ0 ), and gm1 (w) is the density of the
steady state earned wage distribution for type 1 immigrants. Component probability
Pj1 (d1 , y1 , c1 |w) is the joint probability of the residual duration, censoring outcome
and the ending immigrant type of the first job spell, and Ptr (t1 |w, y1 ) is the probability of the observed transition from the job spell. For those who transition to
unemployment, Pu2 (d2 , y2 , c2 |y2 ) accounts for the joint probability of the duration,
ending immigrant type and censoring indicator of the following unemployment spell .
Having presented the overall structure of the likelihood contribution, we now provide the expressions for its components. If an immigrant remains as type 1 during
his first observed spell, the residual duration of the spell follows the exponential
distribution with parameter (α0 λ0 + δ2 ) if it is an unemployment spell, or with parameter (α1 λ1 F (w) + δ) if it is a job spell. Therefore for y1 = 1, Pu1 (d1 , c1 , y1 ) and
Pj1 (d1 , c1 , y1 |w) are given by, respectively,
Pu1 (d1 , c1 , 1) = (α0 λ0 + δ2 )1−c1 e−(α0 λ0 +δ2 +η)d1

(39)

Pj1 (d1 , c1 , 1|w) = (α1 λ1 F (w) + δ)1−c1 e−(α1 λ1 F (w)+δ+η)d1 .

(40)

and

If immigrants change types during the first spell, i.e., y1 = 2, the duration of the
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spell can be given as the sum of two independent exponential random variables. If
the spell is an unemployment spell, the relevant two variables are exponential with
parameters (α0 λ0 + η + δ2 ) and (λ0 + δ2 ). Letting s and (d − s) denote the realizations
of these two variables, the distribution of their summed value, d, is given by
Z

d



e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ2 )s η



e−(λ0 +δ2 )(d−s) (λ0 + δ2 ) ds

0

=


η(λ0 + δ2 )
e−(λ0 +δ2 )d − e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ2 )d .
(α0 − 1)λ0 + η

The probability that a completed unemployment spell ends with a transition to a job
is λ0 /(λ0 + δ2 ), therefore for y1 = 2 and c1 = 0, Pu1 (d1 , y1 , c1 ), is given by
Pu1 (d1 , 2, 0) =


ηλ0
e−(λ0 +δ2 )d1 − e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ2 )d1 .
(α0 − 1)λ0 + η

(41)

If the spell is censored, i.e., c1 = 1, the relevant expression for Pu1 (d1 , y1 , c1 ) is given
by
Z

∞


η(λ0 + δ2 )
e−(λ0 +δ2 )τ − e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ2 )τ dτ
d1 (α0 − 1)λ0 + η
e−(α0 λ0 +η+δ2 )d1 i
η(λ0 + δ2 ) h e−(λ0 +δ2 )d1
−
.
=
(α0 − 1)λ0 + η λ0 + δ2
α0 λ0 + η + δ2

Pu1 (d1 , 2, 1) =

(42)

Analogously, if a type 1 immigrant become a type 2 immigrant during a job spell,
the spell duration is the sum of two independent exponential random variables with
parameters, respectively, (α1 λ1 F (w) + η + δ) and (λ1 F (w) + δ). If it is a completed
spell, i.e., c1 = 0, the expression for Pj1 (d1 , y1 , c1 |w) is given by
Z
Pj1 (d1 , 2, 0|w) =

d1

e−(α1 λ1 F (w)+δ+η)s ηe−(λ1 F (w)+δ)(d1 −s) (λ1 F (w) + δ)ds

0

=


η(λ1 F (w) + δ)
e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)d1 − e−(α1 λ1 F (w)+δ+η)d1 . (43)
(α1 − 1)λ1 F (w) + η
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If it is censored, it is given by
Z

∞

Pj1 (τ, 2, 0|w)dτ

Pj1 (d1 , 2, 1|w) =
d1

=

e−(α1 λ1 F (w)+δ+η)d1 i
η(λ1 F (w) + δ) h e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)d1
−
.(44)
(α1 − 1)λ1 F (w) + η λ1 F (w) + δ
α1 λ1 F (w) + δ + η

If an immigrant starts the second spell as a type 1 immigrant, i.e., y1 = 1, the component probabilities given in equations (39) – (44) apply, so that Pu2 (d2 , c2 , y2 |y1 =
1) = Pu1 (d2 , c2 , y2 ) and Pj2 (d2 , c2 , y2 |w, y1 = 1) = Pj1 (d2 , c2 , y2 |w). If an immigrant
is of type 2 at the start of a spell, the duration of the spell follows the exponential
distribution with parameter (λ0 + δ2 ) if it is an unemployment spell or with parameter (λ1 F (w) + δ) if it is a job spell. Therefore for y1 = y2 = 2, Pu2 (d2 , y2 , c2 |y1 ) and
Pj2 (d2 , y2 , c2 |y1 ) are, respectively,
Pu2 (d2 , 2, c2 |2) = (λ0 + δ2 )1−c2 e−(λ0 +δ2 )d2 ,
and
Pj2 (d2 , 2, c2 |w, 2) = (λ1 F (w) + δ)1−c2 e−(λ1 F (w)+δ)d2 .
For j ∈ {1, 2}, Ptr (tj |w, yj ) is the component probability of the transition outcome
from a job spell. Depending on the ending immigrant type, it is given by
1−t

Ptr (tj |w, yj = 1) =

(α1 λ1 F (w))tj δ1 j
,
α1 λ1 F (w) + δ

or

1−t

(λ1 F (w))tj δ1 j
Ptr (tj |w, yj = 2) =
.
λ1 F (w) + δ
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